




V i r g i n i a C o m m o n w e a l t h U n i v e r s i t y



Department of Mechanical & Nuclear Engineering

Nuclear Events and Lessons Learned

April 25, 2012

Joshua Bell

Dr. Sama Bilbao y Leon

Osher Lifelong Learning Institute

Spring 2012



V i r g i n i a C o m m o n w e a l t h U n i v e r s i t y

Department of Mechanical
& Nuclear Engineering

Content

- Three Mile Island
- Chernobyl
- Fukushima Daiichi




Objectives

- General knowledge of incident progression
- Understanding of the root cause of each incident
- Understanding of radiological effects of the releases from each incident
- General knowledge of lessons learned from each event
- Most importantly: How those lessons have been applied to make the industry safer

Contents

- For each incident we will cover:
 - Reactor Type
 - The Accident
 - Consequences
 - Lessons Learned



THREE MILE ISLAND

THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 (TMI-2)

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED



Three Mile Island Nuclear Station




Three Mile Island Nuclear Station



TMI-2 Reactor Coolant System






Relief Valves


Steam Volume

Water Volume



TMI-2 Pressurizer

TMI-2 Station Schematic



THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 (TMI-2)

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED


TMI-2 Control Room




Accident Progression





Accident Progression




Accident Progression




Accident Progression



Accident Progression



Accident Progression



THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 (TMI-2)


THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT


THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED


Radioactivity





Hydrogen





At High Temperatures





Core Status




Core Status



Emergency Response



Dignitaries, Briefings & Media




Technical Support



Department of Mechanical
& Nuclear Engineering

Radiation Safety

Closed-Circuit Monitor



Change Room



Respirator





"Anti-Cs"




First Manned Entry



Damage from Hydrogen



Stairwell to Basement – Flooded w/ 8-ft of Water



Containment Decontamination

Strippable
Coatings
Scabbling
Hydro Lasing
Manual
Robotic



Other Consequences

- Direct Costs of Recovery – \$1 Billion
- TMI-1 6½-Years Before Restart
- Nuclear Industry
 - Backfit & License-Related Costs
 - Many Reactor Orders Cancelled
 - No New Reactor Orders Post-Accident

THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 (TMI-2)

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED

Accident Summary

- Most Serious Accident in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power History
- Reactor Core Melted (Not Known at Time)
- Large Releases to Containment Building
- Only Minor Environmental Releases & Consequences
- Profound Effects
 - Utility
 - Nuclear Industry
 - Regulatory Authorities

TMI-2 Lessons Learned



U.S.NRC

INPO



TMI-2 Lessons Learned

- Technical Assessment
 - Control Room Redesign
 - Annunciator Prioritization
 - Direct Indication
 - Symptom-Based Procedures
- Worker and Public Health and Safety
- Emergency Planning and Response
 - Off-Site Emergency Operation Center
 - Full Scope Drills/Exercises
- The Public Right to Information

CHERNOBYL



CHERNOBYL UNIT 4


THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT


THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED

RBMK Reactor



RBMK Reactor



Virginia Commonwealth University

Department of Mechanical
& Nuclear Engineering



CHERNOBYL UNIT 4

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED


Background

- Test to be Conducted
 - Provide Emergency Electrical Power
 - Use Turbine “Coast-Down” Power
 - Difficulty / Timing
- Test Plan
 - Preparer Not Familiar w/ RBMK-1000
 - Review Requirements Not in Place




Test Plan


Turbine Coastdown Test (Properly Executed)




The Accident



The Accident



The Accident



The Accident



CHERNOBYL UNIT 4


THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT


THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED

The Consequences




The Consequences



Evacuation



Radiological Release



Radiological Release

Comparison of Chernobyl & TMI-2 Accident Source Terms

Constituent	Chernobyl	TMI-2
Noble Gases	100%	< 8 %
Iodine	40% (20 MCi)	< 2×10^{-5} % (18 Ci)
Cs	25%	--
Te	>10%	--
Particulate	3-6%	--



Fire Fighter Memorial




Molten Fuel


“Elephant’s Foot”

Dose Rate
1,000,000
Sv/hr

Fuel Fused
w/ Sand



Sarcophagus



CHERNOBYL UNIT 4

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons Learned

- Most Significant Lesson →
 - Importance of Learning from Experience
 - Soviet Precursors at Kursk (1980) & Perhaps Leningrad
 - *Failure to Evaluate TMI-2 Lessons Learned*
- Initial Soviet Evaluation →
 - Operator Error
- World Evaluation Added →
 - **Design Management Systems**

Lessons Learned

- Operator Error
- Design Deficiencies
- Management System Deficiencies
- Inadequate Safety Culture
- International Perspective

**TRAGEDY HAS
INDUCED
CAUTION**





Fukushima - Daiichi

Fukushima - Daiichi



THE REACTORS

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED

Reactor: BWR



Fukushima - Daiichi

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED




Tohoku Earthquake

Tohoku Earthquake



Tohoku Earthquake

11 March 2011 – 14:46



Ground Acceleration

Nr.	MWe	3.11 Observed (max. gal)			Design (Ss) (max. gal)		
		N-S	E-W	Vertical	N-S	E-W	Vertical
1Fuku1	460	460	447	258	487	489	412
1Fuku2	784	346	550	302	441	438	420
1Fuku3	784	322	507	231	449	441	429
1Fuku4	784	281	319	200	447	445	422
1Fuku5	784	311	548	256	452	452	427
1Fuku6	1100	298	444	244	445	448	415

GAL = galileos

gal to g's

100 gal = 0.102 g's


VA Earthquake
Highest Acceleration:
 ≈ 120 gal

Acceleration Damage




SHUTDOWN / TRIP

- Cuts off turbine building
- Diesel generators start
- Emergency core cooling systems are supplied
- Plant is in a stable safe state



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami




Tsunami



Tsunami



Tsunami




Accident Progression


- ▶ Pl
- up
- ▶ Act
- m
- ▶ Flo
- ▶ Ess
- Bu
- ▶ Sta
- ▶ Fai
- em
- sys




Accident Progression




Accident Progression




Accident Progression




Accident Progression




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
Accident Progression



Accident Progression



Accident Progression



Accident Progression

Unit 1 & 3




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Accident Progression

Unit 2



Accident Progression




Accident Progression

Unit 4



Accident Progression Spent Fuel Pools



Fukushima - Daiichi

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE RECOVERY

THE LESSONS LEARNED


Radiation Release

- CT Scan: 6 -18 mSv
- Monitoring underway for 2 million residents of Fukushima
 - 40% received less than 1 mSv;
 - <1% received more than 20 mSv
 - Remainder were between 1 and 20 mSv
- Significant doses occurred to some workers in the first few weeks
 - 167 workers received >100 mSv
 - Emergency dose limit was raised to 250 mSv until December 2011, now set at 100 mSv


Radiation in the Environment around Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Source: MEXT, U.S.DOE, and others



Air Dose Rate over 1 meter above Ground Level (microSv/h)
Normalized to April 29



Max. Value (Bq/L) of Cesium 137
Concentration in Seawater (Surface)
up to May 7



Max. and Min. Values (Bq/kg) of
Cesium 137 Concentration in Land Soil
up to May 9



Recovery

- ▶ March 12: Sea Water continued to be used for cooling Reactors
- ▶ March 15: Units 1 & 3 Stable
- ▶ March 17: Unit 2 Stable
- ▶ March 20: Units 5 & 6 in cold shutdown
- ▶ March 22: Power restored on site
- ▶ March 25: Switch to fresh water for core cooling



Recovery



- ▶ May 6: Enter Unit 1 building for the first time
- ▶ June 15: Sea Water Filtering system begins operation
- ▶ August 10: Circulating cooling water restored for all units
- ▶ Sept. 30: Units 1-3 are below boiling
- ▶ October 3: Japanese Government to assist with clean up efforts



Recovery

- ▶ Dec 19: All Units in cold shutdown
- ▶ Dec 26: Cancellation of Nuclear Emergency Situation was declared
- ▶ Feb 13, 2012: Japan establishes INPO style organization
- ▶ Feb 27: TEPCO announces plans to seal sea bed around site



Fukushima - Daiichi

THE REACTOR

THE ACCIDENT

THE CONSEQUENCES

THE LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons Learned Japan

- Severe Accident Management procedures implemented
- Nuclear safety regulation organization formed
 - Nuclear Safety and Security Agency (NSSA)
- Improved training and capability of Nuclear personnel

Lessons Learned USA

- Review of long term loss of off site power regulations
 - Review of standards and criteria for design basis
 - Hydrogen Management
 - Stress test designs
-
- Be humble, especially toward natural phenomena

Acknowledgements

Dr. Sama Bilbao y Leon

Dr. Ronald Allen Knief

ANS

NRC


NEI

IAEA

TEP-CO

VCU

V i r g i n i a C o m m o n w e a l t h U n i v e r s i t y



Department of Mechanical & Nuclear Engineering

VCU

V i r g i n i a C o m m o n w e a l t h U n i v e r s i t y



Department of Mechanical
& Nuclear Engineering