

Politics, Peace Operations, and Human Security

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For the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute at George
Mason University, April 18, 2017

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Presentation Roadmap

- Goals of peacekeeping, how it is authorized and funded.
- Challenges of peacebuilding in fragile states by multilateral bodies (or anybody).
- The added challenges of 'hybrid' missions.
- What we think we know about what works.

Peacekeeping

- **Not in UN Charter:** An adaptive response to the Cold War, decolonization and their respective aftermaths.
- **Traditional Guiding Principles:** Consent, impartiality, & non-use—or minimum use—of force in self-defense & defense of the mandate.
- **Original Operational Concept:** “a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars”;
- **Evolved Concept:** “a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.”

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [“Brahimi Report”],
A/55/305, August 2000)

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How Are Peacekeepers Authorized & Supported?

UN Operations

- **Security Council resolution** mandates operations.
- **General Assembly funds them**, using an agreed “scale of assessment.”
- **Secretariat** selects mission head and force commander;
- UN Depts. of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support plan & recruit.
- **Member states** provide troops and police, including “formed police units.”
- **Mission budgets** fund people and ops, not reconstruction projects.
- **Missions coordinate** with local parties, other aid providers.

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How Are Peacekeepers Authorized & Supported? Non-UN Operations

- **Regionally authorized:**
 - North Atlantic Council (as, Serbia/Kosovo air operations, 1999)
 - African Union Peace and Security Council (as, AU Mission in Somalia since 2007)

- **Coalitions of the willing:**
 - Int'l Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan (authorized by Security Council Res. 1386, Dec. 20, 2001)

Peacebuilding or “Sustaining Peace”

- **Brahimi Report:**

“... activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”

- **Peacebuilding Architecture Review:**

“The multidimensional nature of sustaining peace is unavoidable and poses major challenges to achieving coherence.”

(Report of the **Advisory Group of Experts** on the Review of the [UN] Peacebuilding Architecture,”
A/69/698, 30 June 2015)


Challenges with Fragile States

- “In particular, there are two fundamental public goods which [the 60 countries of the bottom billion] are structurally ill-equipped to supply internally: security and accountability. . . Some form of international supply is necessary. . .”

(Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion*)

- The World Bank tracked the “Fastest 20” fragile states’ average time-to-achievement of levels equivalent to present-day Ghana in control of corruption (27 yrs), government effectiveness (36) and rule of law (41).

(World Bank, *World Development Report 2011, Overview*, table 2.1.)



Security Council's Default Political Strategy

- Support the restoration of central govt authority while providing undefined "stabilization" services;
- Support early national elections as mechanism for building or rebuilding domestic post-conflict government legitimacy;
- Support early disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of some or all armed groups and armed forces;
- Promote early reform of police and courts consistent with international human rights law; and
- Protect civilian populations from imminent threat of physical harm.

(Economic liberalization and restarting the formal economy are not considered the business of the Security Council.)

UN Integrated Missions (1): Civilian-led, multi-functional

- **The political perspective (the S-G, DPKO, DPA, Human Rights):**
 - A Security Council mandate creates a common goal that requires institutional solidarity.
- **The humanitarian perspective (OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR):**
 - Peacekeepers' presence undermines humanitarian space, which aid agencies may need in the next conflict, with no peacekeepers.

Integrated Missions and Mandate Creep

Level of Violence	Description of Levels	UNMOGIBY	UNMIN	UNTAET	MONUC	UNAMIS	UNMISSET	UNMIL	UNOCI	ONUB	MONUSTAH	UNMIS	UNMIT	UNAMID	MINURCAT	UNMISS	MONUSOMA	UNMISS II	MINUSCA
10	No cease-fire; major armed violence in some or all of AOR														X				X
8	Partial cease-fire (btw. certain groups or in parts of AOR)												X	X		X	X		
7	All armed parties sign accord; one or more sign in bad faith				X			X							X				Notional trend line
6	Significant, hostile armed grps not parties to peace accord				X			X	X	X		X				X			
5	All parties sign in good faith; violent factions break away			X					X		X				X				
4	General cease-fire; no peace accord								X		X								
3	Other states/entities use en-forcers for criminal purposes			X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X	X			
2	All armed parties sign accord; one or more obstruct mission	X	X					X		X	X	X	X	X	X				
1	All armed parties sign in good faith; minimal spoiler activity		X				X												

1999 2003 2006 2012

Protection of Civilians

Each element of international action defines it differently:

- Personal security against crime or post-conflict violence, including gender-based violence;
- Legal protection (ending lengthy pre-charge detention; offering witness protection);
- Providing food, water, shelter, a safe return home.


“Responsibility to Protect” entails broader group/societal security against genocidal violence, other forms of mass atrocity, war crimes, & crimes against humanity.

UN Integrated Missions (2): The Span of Authority Problem

The Secretary-General controls only part of the operational UN.


- Other UN programs, funds, & agencies have their own member state governing bodies and (mostly voluntary) funding, and do not answer to Security Council.
- Non-UN aid and development donors are even less susceptible to “integration” but may be willing to coordinate activities in the common interest.


Comparing Notional Multilateral Mission Effectiveness at Different Levels of Attempted Control



Hybrid Operations

- No complex peacebuilding/statebuilding operations are conducted entirely by one entity.
- Donor countries offer varying in-kind support.
- Task sharing may be sequential or simultaneous.






What we know about what is needed to accomplish missions' objectives.

- Sustained great power support for peace and peacekeeping.
- Sustained support for peace in "the neighborhood."
- Local parties' willingness to shift from military to political competition and risk political loss (and survive).
- Nudging local politics beyond wartime leaders.
 - Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia; *versus*
 - Guinea-Bissau, DR Congo, Sudan, South Sudan
- Poor control of natural resources by legitimate local actors can fuel "spoilers."
- International peace support "team" must be able to invest at least a decade in the socio-political-economic transformation.

Durability of change vs. sustainability of trust and hope:

A Mental Model of Peace Ops, Governments and Publics



* Trust as the present measure of public affinity for government. Hope as anticipation that trust will last or improve. Hope becomes trust if government performance earns it. Otherwise, hope wanes and trust is directed to or kept at levels of personal interaction (family, community).