

The Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty



Osher Lifelong Learning Institute
at George Mason University
Broadening Horizons Together



Kent G. Stansberry

27 years – Office of the Secretary of Defense

8 years – Arms Control Policy

Member: U.S. Delegation, START


Member: U.S. Delegation, Standing Consultative Commission

7 years – DoD Arms Control Compliance Official

Discussion is better than a lecture.

Ask questions any time.

“The Far Side” of Arms Control



The New START Treaty



**Prague, Czech Republic
April 8, 2010**

Outline

Background

Strategic Context

Negotiating Process

Strategic Arms Control History

New START Treaty

Key Provisions

Structure


What's Good About It

What's Bad About It

Senate Advise and Consent

Should It Be Ratified?


Strategic Context: Effects of a Nuclear Weapon



Strategic Context: Effects of a Nuclear Weapon

– Blast and Thermal Radiation –

20 MT bomb 2km directly above the US Capital



Strategic Context: Deterrence Kept the Cold War Cold

- **Deterrence**
 - Fear of consequences keeps an opponent from attacking
 - US-USSR: size and lethality of forces grew for decades
 - Counterforce capability undercut “strategic stability”
 - Fear that disparities could be exploited
 - Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) – not a policy, but a result
- **Extended Deterrence**
 - U.S. “nuclear umbrella” protects our allies
 - Has prevented nuclear proliferation, e.g., Germany, Japan, S. Korea
 - Has not prevented all proliferation, e.g., United Kingdom, France, Israel

Strategic Context: U.S. Policy for the Future

Today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons.

The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.

President Obama
Prague, Czech Republic
April 5, 2009

Negotiating Process: Three Phases



Interagency

- White House in the lead
- OSD, Jt Staff, State, Intell Comm, etc.
- Result: Negotiating Instructions

International, Bilateral


- Government Delegations
- Diplomatic formality
- Result: Signed Treaty




U.S. Senate

- Two-thirds majority needed
- Legislative process
- Result: Instrument of Ratification

Strategic Arms Control History



Strategic Arms Control History



Strategic Arms Control History: Limits Over Time

	SALT I Interim Agreement	SALT II	START I	START II	Moscow Treaty	New START
Warheads	None	Indirect limits, e.g., ban on adding warheads to existing types of missiles (>10,000)	6000 attributed	3500 attributed	1700-2200 deployed warheads	1500 deployed warheads
Delivery Vehicles	No increase in number of attributed missiles	2250 attributed	1600 attributed	Ban on MIRVed ICBMs	None	700 deployed missiles and nuclear bombers 800 deployed and non- deployed

New START – Key Provisions (I)

- **Monitoring and Verification**
 - **National Technical Means (NTM)**
 - No interference
 - No concealment
 - **Exchange of Data**
 - **On-site Inspections to confirm data**
 - Type One at bases of deployed and non-deployed SOA
 - Type Two at facilities housing non-deployed and converted SOA
 - **Notifications of movement, conversion, elimination, etc.**
 - **Exhibitions of each type to confirm data**
 - **Monitoring at assembly facilities for mobile ICBMs**
 - **Missile telemetry**
 - No encryption
 - Exchange of tapes

New START – Key Provisions (II)

- **Conversion & Elimination**

- **ICBM launchers, mobile ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and Heavy Bombers**

- **E.g.,** - "The elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph: (a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed, and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavating them to a depth of no less than eight meters or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters; (b) ...; or (c) ..."

- **Mobile ICBMs**

- **Tension between strategic stability and verification**

- **Equal rights, but U.S. won't take advantage**

- **Restrictions relaxed compared to START I**

New START – Key Provisions (III)

- **Ballistic Missile Defenses (I)**

- **Preamble (The Parties Believing that../Desiring to../Committed to...)**

- “Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties,”

- **Treaty Article V, paragraph 3**

- “Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.”

New START – Key Provisions (IV)

- **Ballistic Missile Defenses (II)**

- **Unilateral Statements (not legally binding)**

- **Russia:** "The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Prague on April 8, 2010, may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America. Consequently, the extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty also include a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation."
 - **U.S.:** "The United States of America takes note of the Statement on Missile Defense by the Russian Federation. The United States missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. The United States missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launchers, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats. The United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions."

New START Treaty Structure (I)

Main Treaty Text – 17 pages

Preamble

Art 1. “Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with ...”

Art 2. Numerical Limits

Art 3. Counting Rules

Art 4. Location Restrictions

Art 5. Modernization and Replacement

Art 6. Conversion or Elimination from Accountability

Art 7. Database on Information

Art 8. Ambiguous Situations

Art 9. Exchange of Telemetric Information

Art 10. Verification

Art 11. Inspection Rights

Art 12. Bilateral Consultative Commission

Art 13. No obligations that would conflict

**Art 14. Ratification, Duration (10 years), Right to Withdraw,
Supersedes Moscow Treaty**

Art 16. Amendments

Art 17. Register at the United Nations

New START Treaty Structure (II)

Protocol to the Treaty – 165 pages

- Part 1. Terms and Definitions**
- Part 2. Categories of Data**
- Part 3. Conversion or Elimination Procedures**
- Part 4. Notifications**
- Part 5. Conduct of Inspections**
- Part 6. Bilateral Consultative Commission**
- Part 7. Procedures Regarding Telemetric Information**
- Part 8. Provision Application of the Treaty**
- Part 9. Agreed Statements**
- Part 10. Final Provisions**

Annex on Inspection Activities – 91 page

- Part 1. Transportation**
- Part 2. Unique Identifiers**
- Part 3. Conditions of Inspections**
- Part 4. Site Diagrams**
- Part 5. Inspection Equipment**
- Part 6. Type One Inspection Procedures**
- Part 7. Type Two Inspection Procedures**
- Part 8. Exhibition Procedures**

New START Treaty Structure (III)

Annex on Notifications – 68 pages

Sec.1 General Provisions

Sec.2-8 Notification Formats

Annex on Telemetric Information – 15 pages

Part 1. Definitions

Part 2. General Provisions

Part 3. Recording Media and Interpretive Data

Part 4. Demonstrations of Recording Media and Playback Equipment

Part 5. Provision of Playback Equipment and Spare Parts

Part 6. Training Regarding Playback Equipment

Unilateral Statements

Russian Statement on Missile Defense

U.S Statement on Missile Defense

U.S. Statement on Trident

New START – What's Good

- **Reduces the number of deployed nuclear weapons**
- **Strengthens U.S. security and promotes stability**
- **Provides insight into Russian nuclear forces**
- **Has strong verification to assure compliance (haven't had since Dec. 2009 when START expired)**
- **Preserves the U.S. Triad of nuclear capability**
- **Allows U.S. modernization plans**
- **Allows U.S. missile defense plans**
- **Allows U.S. to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike**

Secretary of Defense Gates WSJ, May 13, 2010

New START – What’s Bad

- 1. Doesn’t move away from Cold War deterrence**
- 2. Restricts U.S. missile defense options**
- 3. Exacerbates problems of atrophy in the U.S. nuclear arsenal**
- 4. Counts conventional prompt global strike weapons against the limits**
- 5. Supports a flawed policy of pursuing nuclear disarmament**
- 6. Is based on a targeting policy that is not governed by a strategy to “protect and defend”**
- 7. Doesn’t address a large Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons**
- 8. Doesn’t appear to limit rail-mobile ICBMs**
- 9. Allows an overly broad mandate for the Bilateral Consultative Commission**
- 10. Is unclear on whether the U.S. may counter future non-Russian threats**
- 11. Is not adequately verifiable**
- 12. Is bolstered by a bad judgment that Russian cheating is only a marginal concern**

New START: Status of Ratification (I)

Senate Resolution of Ratification – *Passed SFRC Sep. 16, 2010* *Reported to Senate Oct. 1, 2010*

Conditions – “binding upon the President”

1. **General compliance**
2. **Presidential certifications and reports on NTM**
3. **Reductions**
4. **Warning of breakout**
5. **Missile defense test telemetry**
6. **Conventional prompt global strike**
7. **Telemetry from tests of conventional prompt global strike**
8. **Bilateral Consultative Commission**
9. **Commitments about U.S. nuclear forces**
10. **Annual Report**

Understandings

1. **Missile defense**
2. **Rail mobile ICBMs**
3. **Future strategic-range, non-nuclear weapons**

New START: Status of Ratification (II)

Senate Resolution of Ratification – *Passed SFRC Sep. 16, 2010* *Reported to Senate Oct. 1, 2010*

Declarations

- 1. Missile defense**
- 2. Defending the United States and allies against strategic attack**
- 3. Conventionally armed, strategic-range weapons**
- 4. Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction**
- 5. Asymmetry in reductions**
- 6. Compliance**
- 7. Senate expects Executive Branch briefings (4/yr) on strategic issues**
- 8. Treaty interpretation**
- 9. Treaty modification or reinterpretation**
- 10. Consultations**
- 11. Tactical nuclear weapons**
- 12. Further strategic arms reductions**
- 13. Modernization and replacement of U.S. strategic delivery vehicles**

The New START Treaty

Should New START Be Ratified?

What would you do if you were a U.S. Senator?

Bring it to a vote during the “lame duck” session?

Vote to approve advise and consent?