Terrorism: War of Ideas[1]
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> **"Terrorism is a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy. Our efforts should be directed at those individuals and organizations…long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power…"** 9-11 Report, 22 July 2004

> **"This war cannot be won militarily. The gun will not win this one. This is a clash of ideas, an information war."** General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, to Joe Galloway, Knight Ridder reporter.

> **"Traditionally, victory went to the country whose armies won. But in a global information Age, victory also depends upon whose story wins. In addition to hard military power, we need skill at winning hearts and minds with soft power—the ability to attract others with our values and culture."** Joseph S. Nye Jr.

> **"We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the Free World."** George W. Bush, August 2004

> **"Support for the United States has plummeted. Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9-11 suggested that many or most people thought the United States was doing the right thing in its fight against terrorism; few people saw popular support for Al Qaeda…by 2003, polls showed that 'the bottom has fallen out' of support for America in most of the Muslim world."** 9-11 Report, 22 July 2004

Introduction.

Our concept of national security was changed forever by the 9-11 attacks on two centers of national power: economic (Twin Towers) and military (Pentagon). Due to the bravery of some passengers on another flight, the third center (Political) was spared. This is an unprecedented threat and according to many critics, it has not been handled in an appropriate way. There are various views on how we should have responded, many held with a tenacity bordering on ideological certainty. Terrorism[2] presents a special national security problem, whether it is

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[1] This is a revised version of a paper I presented at a Symposium on the third anniversary of 9-11 at Hampden-Sydney College, 7-9 September 2004. The only substantive change is the last paragraph of the paper.
[2] The following discussion is designed for those who wish to be analytical in their approach to the subject of terrorism. In the current environment created by the 9-11 tragedies, it is difficult for any American, including this author, to contain emotional hostility toward any suggestion that the acts could be defended on moral grounds. Some of the following, if publicly stated, would be considered by some as unpatriotic at best and probably traitorous. I will state categorically that I would volunteer on a suicide mission to kill Osama bin Laden, so you may know where my

domestic or international in scope. The 9-11 Commission correctly recognized that terrorism is a form of violence used by individuals and groups for political goals. The first hurdle in coping with terrorism is coming to a consensus on a definition. The simple solution is to define all terrorism and counter-terrorism in moral terms of good against evil, but this does not do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon. In the most general sense, terrorism can be defined as **"the use of violence against a non-combatant civilian target when the intended effect is the psychological impact on a wider audience in order to achieve political goals".** In the past, different agencies of the U.S. have used approximations of this definition. If one accepts this definition, the carpet-bombing of cities in WWII, by both sides, can be classified as terrorist acts. All participants in WWII used such measures. The use of atomic bombs on Japan was, in fact, deliberately designed to terrorize the Japanese into surrendering. President Truman's diary and the planning minutes attest to this. Undoubtedly, the atomic attacks avoided the costly invasion of Japan, which most analysts agree would have resulted in millions of deaths, both civilian and military. Before development of the atomic weapons, plans existed to use chemical weapons on civilian targets that would kill millions. The same rationale was used to justify their use. Thus, we considered a range of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" to terrorize the Japanese, all morally justified in our eyes. Not only did those measures prevent a greater loss of lives by a continuation of the war, but they were used in a "just cause."

The rationale that the greater good is served by terrorism may in fact suffice as a moral justification of the acts, but it does so by arguing that the ends justify the means. Some ethicists reject the notion that ends can justify means when the act in itself is immoral. This is not universal, however, and experience shows that most people often justify acts that are immoral per se, but where the consequences of the act can justify it. Thus it becomes a decision calculus that weighs the pros and cons to determine if the consequences can be shown to further a "just cause". Those who bomb civilian targets, as well as those who justify the use of weapons of mass destruction, follow this reasoning. Terrorists who use specific civilian targets, including assassinations, use this rationale for moral justification. This includes suicide bombers. Moral judgment depends on what is a "just cause." There's the rub!

If a belligerent wishes to brand acts of terrorism against it as immoral, it must find a definition that distinguishes the type of terrorism used by it and its allies from that of its adversaries. In the case of the current "war against terrorism", declared by President Bush, this presents problems. It is useful to rally the American people by stating the effort in moralistic terms of good versus evil and rejecting any suggestion that terrorism is any way morally justified. Another way to isolate the Islamic terrorists is to define terrorism to exclude actions of nations or their military. Recent definitions by U.S. Government Agencies in fact offer such definitions, restricting the label to non-nation activity. This has the convenience of putting our use of military force outside the bounds of terrorism. This restricted definition, of course, denies legitimacy to the only means of violence available to the weak and takes away the reciprocal advantage. Terrorism is the force of choice for domestic dissidents and the militarily weak in international affairs because it gives them an asymmetrical advantage, especially if they cannot be readily identified. Non-nation groups conduct much of international terrorism such as the 9-11

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sentiments lie. But this kind of emotional response will not serve us well in the long run and may indeed keep us from solving the real problem. Any honest academic endeavor, however, must strive to be analytical and set emotions aside. I ask the reader to do that as far as possible. Much of my language criticizing U.S. policy is derived from non-U.S. media, statements of foreign leaders, and experience in the Middle East, where I taught a one-week ethics course in late 2001 to 21 senior officers of the Omani Air Force.

acts. While they may have the support of governments, these connections are difficult to prove. This limits the counter-terrorist efforts because over reaction against broad targets can generate more hostility and lose moral legitimacy for the counter terrorism effort. More will be said on this regarding the Iraq war.

Word-smithing to exclude one side's use of terrorism may appeal to the militarily powerful and their followers, but non-nation terrorist groups may argue that the ends justify the means if their terrorist acts result in a change in policies that they label as unjust. Moreover, the current enemies of the United States may argue that U.S. policies themselves involve a form of economic and military terrorism—economic sanctions against Iraq from 1991 to the recent invasion, sanctions against Cuba, etc. and militarily against the Palestinians (through Israel as a proxy), Nicaragua, etc. It all depends on whose ox is being gored; one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Surveys consistently show that much of the Islamic world views terrorists against Israel as "freedom fighters". President Reagan labeled the Islamic terrorists fighting the Russians in Afghanistan in the 80s (including the Taliban, a member of which was Osama bin Laden) as "freedom fighters". They are now "terrorists". Again, it depends on whose ox is being gored.

In all conflicts, each side is convinced of its moral high ground. It then becomes a contest for convincing target audiences that you have the moral high ground. In the current war, the audiences include the American public, the populations in which the enemy operates, and the world community. Thus, the task in the current "war on terrorism" is to convince these target audiences that ours is the moral and just cause. In order to keep support among the populations in which they operate and draw their recruits, the terrorists will have to win the moral argument. The evidence so far is that the terrorists are winning except in the United States and Israel.

The bottom line is that we are facing a threat unlike any we have faced in the past. We are sailing uncharted, perilous seas. There are indications that we may not have accurately identified the nature of this threat and may be solving the wrong problem. Indeed, the phrase "War on Terrorism" is a misnomer that could indicate that we are on the wrong path—as President Bush acknowledged in the above citation. As will be discussed below in more detail, terrorism is a means of violence for political ends; the ultimate purpose is to influence political decisions of adversaries. If we focus too narrowly on the violent acts—the symptoms—we will miss the target and exacerbate the problem. Indeed, Secretary Rumsfeld raised this important question early on:

> **"Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?"** October 2003

Undoubtedly, the early recruitment into the al Qaeda ranks reflected a battle for the hearts and minds of the specific Islamic population from which these recruits came. By most accounts, that was a small fraction of the Islamic world. The 9-11 Commission Report cited above recognizes this fact. Actually, the situation has worsened shortly after the Commission made that observation. A June 2004 Zogby poll taken in Arab States found negative views of the United States as follows: Egypt 98%; Morocco 88%; Saudi Arabia 94%, UAE 73%. The major reasons cited were: unfair foreign policy, e.g., support of Israel and the Iraq war. The same survey showed the most admired people to be: 1) Jacques Chirac; 2) Gamel Nasser, the martyred president of Egypt, 3) Hasan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader; and 4) Sadam Hussein and Osama

bin Laden (tie). Other polls at the time showed the unfavorable view of the United States existed throughout the world, including Europe.

Some dismissed those negative views of the United States as nothing more than jealousy based on our wealth and power and maintained it had nothing to do with our policies. As Senator Zell Miller said at the 2004 Republican National Convention:

> **"In their warped way of thinking, America is the problem, not the solution. They don't believe there is any real danger in the world except that which America brings on itself through our clumsy and misguided foreign policy."**

President Bush described the problem in rather simple terms. "They hate us because we are free"; it is a war of "good versus evil". At the other extreme, some see it as a "clash of civilizations". Some see it as a religious war that is foreordained by God to end in Armageddon. Others see it in more specific terms commonly associated with historical international conflict. **How can we explain these conflicting perceptions when our leaders see terrorism in such stark terms of good and evil?**

Naturally, people disagree on the nature of the current conflict. Men of goodwill and comparable expertise can, and will, disagree on this matter, as you will see in the diverse views expressed in this seminar. I can only do my best to tell it like I see it; however, each of us perceives the complex world through our own perceptual lens and I am not free of this weakness.

Values and Beliefs.

The war of ideas that we are engaged in involves a whole range of beliefs about what is right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust. People in all societies tend toward sociocentrism—the belief that their values and culture are the best, whether it is their economic philosophy, political philosophy, social organization, or religious beliefs. This includes a tendency to see the world as "us" and "them" in terms of these values and cultural traits. Moreover, we filter events in the world through the lenses of these belief systems.

> **"We all carry around with us a big lens, a big framework, through which we look at the world, order events, and decide what is important and what is not."** Thomas L. Friedman, <u>Longitudes and Attitudes</u>, 2003, p. 3

People perceive the world in incompatible ways, yet they may be ready to die to impose their version of "truth" on the rest of the world. It is important to understand where and how individuals get these perspectives. "Biased" perception is more pronounced when our beliefs about what is "right" and "wrong" regarding these behaviors are based on uncritical faith in the sources of those beliefs. Each of us is a product of our own experiences and thus we bring to a situation our own unique belief system that filters the "real world". Moreover, each of us has convictions that our beliefs are based on solid logic and critical thought—that we are seeing the world as it is, unfiltered through a biased perceptual system. How then, do we know what we know to be true? How confident are we that our most cherished values are true? In the "war of ideas" that will be discussed below, it is important to keep these principles in mind.

What, then, are the basic values and beliefs that frame Americans' view of the world? Let us look at the opening paragraph of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy:

> **"The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages."**
> National Security Strategy, The White House, September 2002

In broad terms, this tells the world that American/Western values are the values that must be adopted throughout the world. These values are sacred to Americans. In fact, it is often considered unpatriotic to question the universality of individualism, pluralistic democracy, and free enterprise. Some have gone so far as to declare that these values represent "the end of history". Francis Fukuyama, then with the State Department, wrote "We may be witnessing the end of history as such; that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government", "The End of History", The National Interest, Summer, 1989). He also included free markets as an end state for economic affairs.

The Current Conflict of Ideas.

There are several dimensions to the war of ideas as related to the terrorist threat; they involve economic, environmental, political, and religious beliefs and practices—as well as historical events in the Middle East. These are exceedingly complex and people have sharply differing views about the reality of conditions in the world today, reflecting the "lens" mentioned by Friedman. In a short essay, these complexities can easily be oversimplified. With this caveat, I will do my best to be objective in my approach, but my analysis will be through my unique perceptual filter, as are all analyses.

Samuel P. Huntington provides an excellent summary of the clashing ideas between the Islamic world and the "Western" world in his 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order. He discusses the historical, cultural, political, economic, and religious dimensions that make up "civilizations". Those who assume the Western World values and doctrine represent a universal civilization "…generally share beliefs in individualism, market economies, and political democracy…" Many also believe that the spread of Western consumption patterns and popular culture around the world is creating a universal civilization. He rejects the notion that these beliefs are shared outside the West and states, "only naïve arrogance can lead Westerners to assume that non-Westerners will become 'Westernized' by acquiring Western goods."

In regard to the **religious** dimension, Huntington says:

"Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, the most important usually is religion. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other." P.42

Huntington goes on to warn against the resurgence of religious fundamentalism in all religions as a force that threatens world order.

Huntington sees the conflict between the West and Islam as primarily focused on weapons proliferation, human rights and democracy, control of oil, migration, Islamic terrorism, and Western intervention. Above all, he warns against the notion that the West can impose its values on the non-Western world. He says, "…Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is **false**; it is **immoral**; and it is **dangerous**." That it is false is the central thesis of his book. It is immoral he says because what would be necessary to bring it about. It is dangerous because it could lead to a major intercivilizational war between core states and it is dangerous to the West because it could lead to the defeat of the West. (Pp. 310-311) In a like manner, George Kennan, in a 1985 article in Foreign Affairs, warned the United States against demanding that the world adopt our version of democracy and economic systems as we understand them. These are not necessarily the future of all mankind, nor is it the duty of the United States to insist that they become that. Moreover, he says, much of our foreign policy is the result of pressures from politically influential special interest elements within the society.

The **economic** dimension is perhaps the most universal of the issues that leads to discontent that can foster terrorism. Since WWII, the United States has been at the apex of economic well-being. No doubt this has caused envy from around the world. The industrialized world has prospered and has closed the gap considerably. Parts of the "third world", such as China and India, see hope. Other parts of the world have not been so fortunate. There is a widespread view among many people in these areas that wealthy nations, especially the United States, have been morally weak in the control of the global economy. How far a nation goes in considering morality in the conduct of foreign affairs is a difficult boundary to draw, especially in the area of economics. All moral theories include some concept of distributive justice, which includes the distribution of economic benefits. How far does a wealthy nation such as the United States go in sharing its wealth with less fortunate countries? In addition to foreign aid, trade policies affect the distribution of wealth. There is little consensus on what is just and unjust in these matters. Some argue that the duty of government is to meet the needs of its citizens without regard for the fate of others. Here again, one need not chose all or nothing in considering the moral dimension. Most would agree that the "Marshall Plan" at the end of WWII was not only a moral thing to do, but that it was a practical policy that was in the long-term interest of the United States.

Currently, the U.S. ranks at the bottom of industrial nations in the percentage of its GDP that goes to foreign aid. And even that small amount goes largely to two recipients—chosen for their strategic importance rather than on economic need. Critics of U.S. policy also claim that the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are dictated by the U.S. and favor the "haves" in the world. Based on "free market" ideology, conditions for economic aid from these agencies require recipient countries to structure their economies in a way that sometimes violates value systems and eliminates social safety nets. Perceptions of economic injustice are a

fertile breeding ground for unrest and potential terrorist activity throughout the developing world.

Winning the War of Ideas.

It should be clear to the reader that the central theme of this essay is that victory in the "war on terrorism" will be achieved only if we win the hearts and minds of several target audiences. To date, we appear to be losing that battle among some audiences. A crucial question is: **are we losing the battle because of our failure to communicate effectively, or must we reexamine some of our policies?** This question is best answered by looking at specific target audiences. In doing this, we must keep in mind that borders between these audiences are porous. Unlike wars of the past, where nations could more or less separate these audiences, what is said to one audience is likely to be available to the others. The message that appeals to one may alienate another. Truly, this is the age of global communications.

The **domestic target** is critical. The greatest strength of any group is not its military might, but its will to make sacrifices and cope with adversity, often referred to as morale, esprit, or national will. Research shows such cohesiveness depends on several factors: leadership, a sense of equity, trend of recent experiences, and crises generated by external threats are among the most important. In the aftermath of 9-11, the American public was in a state of shock. This was the **crisis** that galvanized the people. They looked for a concrete target against which they could retaliate. By and large, this was left to the leader—the President—to define. Polls showed that the people were ready to follow Bush's leadership. When it was determined that al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were responsible, the people gave overwhelming support to retaliate with whatever force was deemed necessary. The president had the complete trust of the vast majority of the public. Surveys showed that support and trust extended throughout the world, including the Islamic world. This carried into the war in Afghanistan, where the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden. A reluctant Pakistan, which had helped put the Taliban in power in the 1980s (with the support of the United States), provided critical support for this effort. We then shifted our military effort to Iraq. a summary of that war, as it pertains to our war on terrorism, is in the essay Military Operations and Mid East Policy.

Islamic extremists are not going to be persuaded by words. Moreover, they will not be mollified by policy changes. Even if we were able to settle the Israeli-Palestinian issue, withdraw all forces from the Middle East, allow them to establish Islamic Theocracies throughout the region, etc., this would not abate their implacable hatred for the United States. The only way to deal with this element is to shrink its support base, isolate it, and eliminate it. Unfortunately, the extremists have metastasized into splinter groups spread around the world. The task is becoming more difficult. The longer we lose the war of ideas the harder this task will be.

Islamic moderates are a crucial target audience. Immediately after 9-11, there was apparently a great deal of sympathy for the United States and little support for al Qaeda. This attitude has shifted dramatically since the Iraq war (see quotes of the 9-11 Report, cited above). Unfortunately, the conflict of ideas between the Islamic world and the United States and its coalition partners, has evolved more and more into a conflict of religions. If this continues on its path, it will be difficult to reverse. Bush initially used some unfortunate terms such as "crusade" to define the conflict. This evoked some deep-seated memories among Muslims. Compounding this problem are the inflammatory statements of some of the leaders of Christian fundamentalists, cited above. Bush also reduced the problem to simplistic terms of "you are either with us or against us" and "all terrorism is evil". This sells well to the American audience;

it does not to the rest of the world. When this is intertwined with the Israeli/Palestinian issue, it is a volatile mix (see above). Our perceived bias toward Israel's security as opposed to justice for the Palestinians—by both political parties—is an obstacle. In recent congressional testimony, General Petraeus cited this condition. The recent public tension between Obama and Netanyahu has highlighted this problem. There is little likelihood this will change, however (see Friedman comments, above), so we will have to live with that and pay the price.

We need to diffuse this trend toward polarization of the Islamic world on one side and Christian and Jewish fundamentalists on the other. This trend is pushing moderate Muslims into the radical base from which the terrorist organizations are drawing support—both recruits and sympathy. I don't believe this is going to be accomplished by improved propaganda techniques or restructuring of our television and radio organizations. Nor will it be accomplished by exporting democracy and market economies, as the administration seems to believe. Rather, this will require a reexamination of our entire foreign policy toward the Middle East.

The **world community** is also a critical target audience. Many argue that we can only succeed in the war against terrorism if it is a coordinated international effort. This administration has alienated much of the world by its go-it-alone policies. It has shown outright contempt for allies and international institutions that do not uncritically support the United States. In a more general sense, this includes our rejection of protocols on such issues as global warming, international courts, and law of the seas. The National Security Strategy announced in 2002, and restated in the 2006 NSS document, which some critics have labeled **Pax Americana**, is manifest in the war in Iraq, and lends credence to the perception that we have contempt for international institutions. Policies that do not have international legitimacy may satisfy the public's jingoistic, chauvinistic sentiments, but they do not serve our long-term interests. The people applauded when President Bush said, "if no one joins us, we will go it alone…after all, this is America". Those who dissented were called unpatriotic at best, and often labeled as traitors.

It has become popular in some circles to dismiss the United Nations and other international institutions as debating societies that serve irresponsible demands of Third World countries. Admittedly, working toward international moral order based on shared values requires a great deal of patience. However, we cannot expect to have our way on every issue. It is difficult to achieve agreement on other than abstract values and rules that lend themselves to a wide variety of interpretations, but the effectiveness of these moral concepts depends to a large measure on the voluntary response to world opinion, usually expressed through the international institutions involved. Few of these institutions have the ability to enforce their judgments. In the case of the U.N., the Security Council must take action if a resolution is to have teeth, and each of the five permanent members has veto authority. When one of these permanent members vetoes a resolution passed overwhelmingly by the body, it implies a rejection of moral consensus. Used sparingly when one's vital interests are involved is understandable; flagrant use reflects disdain for multilateral approaches to world order and an arrogance of power. By its repeated flouting of world opinion, the United States has gained the reputation of being arrogant.

The Obama Strategy.

The Obama administration claims to have adopted a different approach to national security issues. In many ways, it still adheres to the "Wilsonian Idealism" goal of exporting democracy and free market economic systems. But it clearly favors working through the international community than did the Bush administration. It also places more emphasis on the

economic dimension of national security and retreats from the notion that military force is the central element of national power. Here is a summary of how Michele Flournoy, Defense Under Secretary for Policy described it in speeches in 2009:

By JOHN T. BENNETT
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Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy described on April 29 how the Obama administration will fashion and carry out its national security policies, and the plan marks a clear break from the Bush era. Flournoy said the new security policy machine will use realistic assessments, seek close coordination with allies, heed international accords and engage in difficult situations.

Flournoy said the new security policy machine will use realistic assessments, seek close coordination with allies, heed international accords and engage in difficult situations.

The Bush administration, by contrast, often stuck to ideological aims, repeatedly shunned some traditional U.S. allies, and ignored several global pacts.
During an April 29 presentation at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she once worked as an analyst, Flournoy said the Obama defense team will craft and carry out its policies by following six guiding principles:
* Pragmatism. She told the standing-room-only audience that "we will put pragmatism first, not ideology."
* Constant engagement. Under the Obama team, she said, Washington will "remain engaged in critical regions," something she called "absolutely essential." This will include a "commitment to international norms," strengthening traditional alliances and other things, she said. "Neo-isolationism is not an option," the policy chief said.
* "Smarter" engagement. The administration will think twice about how to use the U.S. military and will be "more proactive" on using America's soft power tools, meaning things like the diplomatic, economic development and political assistance arms of the federal government.
* International pacts. Flournoy promised Washington will "champion the rules of law," including international laws and treaties, while also "leading the way in adapting international orders." The Bush administration shunned global pacts such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty
* Alliances. She called traditional alliances "absolutely essential," and stressed the importance of helping partner nations increase their own abilities to take care of problems.
* "Whole of government." "We must recommend that, in many cases, military power will not be enough to deal with 21st century problems," she said. Such matters mean Washington must use "whole-of-government" solutions, which she said requires tools from agencies of all stripes. Critics often blasted the Bush administration for first turning only to the U.S. military to solve global challenges.

I heard the same presentation at the National Defense University, but didn't take notes.

Summary.

Winning the protracted war on terrorism will require national cohesion and a willingness to make sacrifices for years to come. And yet we are a deeply divided nation in regard to how best to wage the war against extremist individuals and groups who have no apparent limits on the use of terrorism. While some look for the answer in more use of military force, it comes down to a "war of ideas", which we now appear to be losing. More extensive and sophisticated communication techniques will not solve the problem unless we face up to the reasons why the hatred is so intense. Some reasons may be illegitimate or contrary to our national interests. Other factors are amenable to change, though some will be politically difficult.

It will take courageous statesmen in leadership positions to make some of the necessary changes, since the current political climate in the United States is inclined toward jingoistic, self-righteous, moralistic, unilateral solutions. Ideological rigidity that favors unilateralism and pre-

emptive wars without regard to international opinion, mixed with religious fundamentalism will be a big hurdle. We need to use more "soft power", as Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington have suggested. . The time to strengthen international moral order is when one is on top. Henry Kissinger comments at the end of his book, <u>Does America Need a Foreign Policy:</u> "America's ultimate challenge is to transfer its power into a moral consensus, promoting its values not by imposition, but by their willing acceptance." In his classic article "Morality in Foreign Policy", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, 1985, George Kennan warned the United States against demanding that the world adopt our version of democracy and economic systems as we understand them. He says these are not necessarily the future of all mankind, nor is it the duty of the United States to insist that they become that.

How important is it to have legitimacy in the eyes of the world community? An article in the <u>Ethics and International Affairs</u> (Vol. 9, 1995) was titled "The United Nations and Global Security: The Norm is Mightier Than the Sword." In essence, the author concludes that working through international institutions is more effective in the long term than the use of force. A similar point was made by another article in the same publication, "Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing U.S. Multilateralism."(Vol. 17, 2003).

It remains to be seen if Obama's approach to foreign policy will reap benefits in gaining international cooperation in defeating radical elements that use terrorism to achieve political goals. Hawks criticize the approach as "naïve." Others applaud it as being pragmatic. This divide does not break along party lines, although Republicans tend to be more hawkish than Democrats. We should remember, however, that the Neo-conservative movement started Senator Jackson, a Democrat. Senator Lieberman follows in that tradition and is a super-hawk.

As I write this paragraph, the morning paper cites a reputable poll shows that 60% of Pakistanis consider the U.S. an enemy. Demonstrators in Afghanistan are calling for the U.S. to leave the country. The two wars have cost us dearly in terms of casualties, military readiness, and dollars. Conservative estimates suggest the total economic costs will be several trillion dollars. These ventures may well be putting us on a road described by Paul Kennedy's book, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Empires." He makes a good case that the great empires of the past bankrupted themselves by over reach of military power. One month after the invasion of Iraq, he wrote an op-ed piece, "The Perils of Empire."